David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Analysis 72 (2):316-318 (2012)
Personal pronoun revisionism (so-called by Olson, E. 2007. What are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press) is a response to the problem of the thinking animal on behalf of the neo-Lockean theorist. Many worry about this response. The worry rests on asking the wrong question, namely: how can two thinkers that are so alike differ in this way in their cognitive capacities? This is the wrong question because they don't. The right question is: how can they fail to be the same? From the materialist viewpoint shared by the animalist and neo-Lockean they can't. Personal pronoun revisionism is a consequence of their cognitive identity
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Harold W. Noonan (2010). The Thinking Animal Problem and Personal Pronoun Revisionism. Analysis 70 (1):93-98.
E. Furberg (2012). Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What Is the Problem? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (1):60-73.
Raffaele Rodogno (2012). Personal Identity Online. Philosophy and Technology 25 (3):309-328.
Wai-hung Wong (2008). Meaningfulness and Identities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):123-148.
James Giles (1997). No Self to Be Found: The Search for Personal Identity. University Press of America.
Rory Madden (2011). Intention and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):325-351.
Gerard P. Montague, Personal Identity and Self as Narrative : Formal Identity and Narrative Identity as Two Essential Building Blocks in the Constitution of Self.
David Hershenov (2008). A Hylomorphic Account of Personal Identity Thought Experiments. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (3):481 - 502.
John G. Miller (2004). Qbq!: The Question Behind the Question: Practicing Personal Accountability in Work and in Life. G. P. Putnam's Sons.
Stephan Blatti (2007). Animalism and Personal Identity. In M. Bekoff (ed.), Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships. Greenwood Press.
Manuel Vargas (2005). The Revisionist's Guide to Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):399-429.
Matti Eklund (2004). Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy. The Monist 87 (4):489-511.
Jeanette K. Gundel, Michael Hegarty & Kaja Borthen (2003). Cognitive Status, Information Structure, and Pronominal Reference to Clausally Introduced Entities. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (3):281-299.
Sophia Vasalou (2008). Personal Identity as a Task. Inquiry 51 (3):288 – 311.
Added to index2012-02-22
Total downloads36 ( #48,893 of 1,102,878 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #16,268 of 1,102,878 )
How can I increase my downloads?