David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 72 (2):316-318 (2012)
Personal pronoun revisionism (so-called by Olson, E. 2007. What are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press) is a response to the problem of the thinking animal on behalf of the neo-Lockean theorist. Many worry about this response. The worry rests on asking the wrong question, namely: how can two thinkers that are so alike differ in this way in their cognitive capacities? This is the wrong question because they don't. The right question is: how can they fail to be the same? From the materialist viewpoint shared by the animalist and neo-Lockean they can't. Personal pronoun revisionism is a consequence of their cognitive identity
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Andrew M. Bailey (2015). Animalism. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Stephan Blatti (2010). Editor's Introduction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):1-2.
Stephan Blatti (2014). Editor's Introduction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52:1-5.
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