David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):75-100 (2003)
I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the requirement of total evidence—are given a weight in attentive consciousness which does not correspond to our reflective judgement of their weight. Successful interpretation does not involve ascribing beliefs and desires by reference to what a subject ought to believe and desire, contrary to what Interpretists suggest
|Keywords||Consciousness Epistemology Evidence Interpretation Self-deception|
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Citations of this work BETA
Juha Räikkä (2007). Self-Deception and Religious Beliefs. Heythrop Journal 48 (4):513–526.
Paul Noordhof (2002). Personal Dualism and the Argument From Differential Vagueness. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):63-86.
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