Thought 1 (2):134-140 (2012)
|Abstract||According to genuine modal realism, some things (including numbers and properties) lack distinct counterparts in different worlds. So how can they possess any of their properties contingently? Egan (2004) argues that to explain such accidental property possession, the genuine modal realist must depart from Lewis and identify properties with functions, rather than with sets of possibilia. We disagree. The genuine modal realist already has the resources to handle Egan's proposed counterexamples. As we show, she does not need to amend her analysis of possibility statements, or her theory of what properties are|
|Keywords||properties David Lewis possibilia modal realism counterparts accidental properties|
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