The closest continuer theory of identity

Inquiry 28 (1-4):195 – 229 (1985)
Abstract
A plausible principle governing identity is that whether a later individual is identical with an earlier individual cannot ever merely depend on whether there are, at the later time, any better candidates for identity with the earlier individual around. This principle has been a bone of contention amongst philosophers interested in identity for many years. In his latest book Philosophical Explanations Robert Nozick presents what I believe to be the strongest case yet made out for the rejection of this principle. My aim in this paper is to argue, with reference in particular to personal and artefact identity, that Nozick's case can be met and that a theory of identity which entails the correctness of this principle is the equal, indeed the superior, in explanatory power of the theory Nozick develops on the basis of its rejection
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References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (1975). Contingent Identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):187-222.
Allan Gibbard (1997). Contingent Identity1. In Michael C. Rea (ed.), Material Constitution. Rowman & Littlefield. 93.
Derek Parfit (1971). Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.

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Citations of this work BETA
Katherine Hawley (2005). Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):602-621.
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