David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Psyche 6 (15) (2000)
This paper looks at two puzzles raised by the phenomenon of inattentional blindness. First, how can we see at all if, in order to see, we must first perceptually attend to that which we see? Second, if attention is required for perception, why does it seem to us as if we are perceptually aware of the whole detailed visual field when it is quite clear that we do not attend to all that detail? We offer a general framework for thinking about perception and perceptual consciousness that addresses these questions and we propose, in addition, an informal account of the relation between attention and consciousness. On this view, perceptual awareness is a species of attention
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George A. Alvarez (2011). Representing Multiple Objects as an Ensemble Enhances Visual Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):122-131.
Matthew Kennedy (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298-325.
Jason Leddington (2009). Perceptual Presence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502.
Matthew Kennedy (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298–325.
Steven L. Franconeri, Jason M. Scimeca, Jessica C. Roth, Sarah A. Helseth & Lauren E. Kahn (2012). Flexible Visual Processing of Spatial Relationships. Cognition 122 (2):210-227.
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