David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670 (2003)
Contrary to formal theories of induction, I argue that there are no universal inductive inference schemas. The inductive inferences of science are grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that all inductive inference is local. Some are so localized as to defy familiar characterization. Since inductive inference schemas are underwritten by facts, we can assess and control the inductive risk taken in an induction by investigating the warrant for its underwriting facts. In learning more facts, we extend our inductive reach by supplying more localized inductive inference schemes. Since a material theory no longer separates the factual and schematic parts of an induction, it proves not to be vulnerable to Hume's problem of the justification of induction.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jan Willem Romeijn (2006). Analogical Predictions for Explicit Similarity. Erkenntnis 64 (2):253 - 280.
Jim Bogen (2005). Regularities and Causality; Generalizations and Causal Explanations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (2):397-420.
Jacob Busch & Joe Morrison (2016). Should Scientific Realists Be Platonists? Synthese 193 (2):435-449.
Alan C. Love (2013). Erratum To: Theory is as Theory Does: Scientific Practice and Theory Structure in Biology. [REVIEW] Biological Theory 7 (4):430 - 430.
Wendy S. Parker (2010). Predicting Weather and Climate: Uncertainty, Ensembles and Probability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 41 (3):263-272.
Similar books and articles
Louis E. Loeb (2006). Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume's Argument About Induction. Synthese 152 (3):321 - 338.
P. D. Magnus (2008). Demonstrative Induction and the Skeleton of Inference. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):303 – 315.
John D. Norton (2010). There Are No Universal Rules for Induction. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777.
John D. Norton, The Inductive Significance of Observationally Indistinguishable Spacetimes: (Peter Achinstein has the Last Laugh).
John D. Norton (2013). A Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction. Synthese 191 (4):1-20.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads129 ( #28,132 of 1,792,085 )
Recent downloads (6 months)16 ( #50,371 of 1,792,085 )
How can I increase my downloads?