Against Structuralist Theories of Computational Implementation
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
| Abstract | Under what conditions does a physical system implement or realize a computation? Structuralism about computational implementation, espoused by Chalmers and others, holds that a physical system realizes a computation just in case the system instantiates a pattern of causal organization isomorphic to the computation’s formal structure. I argue against structuralism through counter-examples drawn from computer science. On my opposing view, computational implementation sometimes requires instantiating semantic properties that outstrip any relevant pattern of causal organization. In developing my argument, I defend anti-individualism about computational implementation: relations to the social environment sometimes help determine whether a physical system realizes a computation. 1 The Physical Realization Relation2 Semantics and Computational Implementation3 Conforming to Instructions4 Implementing a Computer Program4.1 The denotational semantics of Scheme4.2 Worries about intentionality4.3 Worries about the natural numbers5 Implementing a Machine Model6 Bounded Structuralism7 Triviality Arguments8 Anti-individualism about Computational Implementation | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesMatthias Scheutz (2001). Computational Vs. Causal Complexity. Minds And Machines 11 (4):543-566.
David J. Chalmers (1994). On Implementing a Computation. Minds and Machines 4 (4):391-402.
Marcin Miłkowski (2011). Beyond Formal Structure: A Mechanistic Perspective on Computation and Implementation. Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):359-379.
David J. Chalmers (2011). A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition. Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.
Lukáš Sekanina (forthcoming). Evolved Computing Devices and the Implementation Problem. Minds and Machines.
Matthias Scheutz (1999). When Physical Systems Realize Functions. Minds and Machines 9 (2):161-196.
Ronald L. Chrisley (1994). Why Everything Doesn't Realize Every Computation. Minds and Machines 4 (4):403-20.
Emiliano Boccardi (2009). Who's Driving the Syntactic Engine? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):23 - 50.
Marcin Miłkowski (2012). Is Computation Based on Interpretation? Semiotica 188 (1):219-228.
David J. Chalmers (1996). Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton? Synthese 108 (3):309-33.
Curtis Brown (2004). Implementation and Indeterminacy. Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology 37.
Colin Klein (2008). Dispositional Implementation Solves the Superfluous Structure Problem. Synthese 165 (1):141 - 153.
Michael Rescorla (2012). Are Computational Transitions Sensitive to Semantics? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):703-721.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-03-03Total downloads15 ( #78,614 of 549,047 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,047 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
