"Brain-paradox" and "embeddment": Do we need a "philosophy of the brain"?

Brain and Mind 195 (2):195-211 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Present discussions in philosophy of mind focuson ontological and epistemic characteristics ofmind and on mind-brain relations. In contrast,ontological and epistemic characteristics ofthe brain have rarely been thematized. Rather,philosophy seems to rely upon an implicitdefinition of the brain as "neuronal object''and "object of recognition'': henceontologically and epistemically distinct fromthe mind, characterized as "mental subject'' and"subject of recognition''. This leads to the"brain-paradox''. This ontological and epistemicdissociation between brain and mind can beconsidered central for the problems of mind andmind-brain relations that have yet to beresolved in philosophy. The brain itself hasnot been thematized epistemically andontologically, leading to a "brain problem''.The epistemic and ontological dissociationbetween brain and mind presupposes an"isolated'' picture of the brain, characterizedby context-independence (i.e. "isolation'' frombody and environment). We can describe thisview as an extrinsic relationship betweenbrain, body and environment. However, based onrecent empirical findings about body image andphantom sensations, we can no longer considerthe brain as context-independent or "isolated''from its bodily and environmental context.Instead, the brain must be considered"embedded''. Within the context of 'embeddment',brain and bodily/environmental context seemmutually to determine each other, and hence bereciprocally dependent on each other. We candescribe this as an intrinsic relationshipbetween brain, body and environment.Defining the brain as "embedded'' undermines theepistemic and ontological dissociation betweenbrain and mind and consequently resolves the"brain-paradox''. This resolution sheds novellight on problems of mind and mind-brainrelations by relativizing both. It is thereforeconcluded that philosophy should thematizeontological and epistemic characteristics ofthe brain, thereby taking into account the"brain problem'' and developing a "philosophy ofthe brain''. This approach not only opens a newfield in philosophy but also extends the focusof empirical investigation in the neurosciencesto take into account the intrinsic relationshipbetween brain, body and environment

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
93 (#178,015)

6 months
8 (#283,518)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Georg Northoff
University of Ottawa

Citations of this work

What is neurophilosophy? A methodological account.Georg Northoff - 2004 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (1):91-127.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The ways of paradox.W. V. Quine - 1966 - New York,: Random.
The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science.Tim van Gelder - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):615-28.
An embodied cognitive science?Andy Clark - 1999 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (9):345-351.
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philiosophical Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1984 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Synaesthesia in phantom Limbs induced with mirrors.Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Diane Rogers-Ramachandran - 1996 - Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 263:377-386.

View all 8 references / Add more references