David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Huw Price & Richard Corry (eds.), Philosophers' Imprint. Oxford University Press (2007)
I deny that the world is fundamentally causal, deriving the skepticism on non-Humean grounds from our enduring failures to find a contingent, universal principle of causality that holds true of our science. I explain the prevalence and fertility of causal notions in science by arguing that a causal character for many sciences can be recovered, when they are restricted to appropriately hospitable domains. There they conform to a loose collection of causal notions that form a folk science of causation. This recovery of causation exploits the same generative power of reduction relations that allows us to recover gravity as a force from Einstein's general relativity and heat as a conserved fluid, the caloric, from modern thermal physics, when each theory is restricted to appropriate domains. Causes are real in science to the same degree as caloric and gravitational forces.
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Citations of this work BETA
Matt Farr & Alexander Reutlinger (2013). A Relic of a Bygone Age? Causation, Time Symmetry and the Directionality Argument. Erkenntnis 78 (2):215-235.
Markus Eronen (2012). Pluralistic Physicalism and the Causal Exclusion Argument. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):219-232.
Alexander Reutlinger (2012). Getting Rid of Interventions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (4):787-795.
Mathias Frisch (2012). No Place for Causes? Causal Skepticism in Physics. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):313-336.
Charlotte Werndl (2009). Are Deterministic Descriptions and Indeterministic Descriptions Observationally Equivalent? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 40 (3):232-242.
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