Graduate studies at Western
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):88-94 (2005)
|Abstract||A central premise in Tyler Burge's argument for social externalism says that an incomplete understanding can be sufficient for concept possession. Burge claims that this premise is grounded in ordinary practices of giving psychological explanations. On the basis of an extended version of Burge's 'arthritis' case Donald Davidson has argued that this claim is false. The paper argues that Davidson's argument is unconvincing. A closer analysis of Davidson's extended 'arthritis' case shows that the belief ascriptions Davidson focuses on actually support social externalism|
|Keywords||Concept Epistemology Externalism Social Burge, T Davidson, D|
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