David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):723-760 (2006)
We first describe how the concept of “fringe consciousness” can characterise gradations of consciousness between the extremes of implicit and explicit learning. We then show that the NEO-PI-R personality measure of openness to feelings, chosen to reflect the ability to introspect on fringe feelings, influences both learning and awareness in the serial reaction time task under conditions that have previously been associated with implicit learning . This provides empirical evidence for the proposed phenomenology and functional role of fringe consciousness in so-called implicit learning paradigms . Introducing an individual difference variable also helped to identify possible limitations of the exclusion task as a measure of conscious sequence knowledge. Further exploration of individual differences in fringe awareness may help to avoid polarity in the implicit learning debate, and to resolve apparent inconsistencies between previous SRT studies
|Keywords||*Implicit Learning *Individual Differences *Phenomenology *Sequential Learning Consciousness States Reaction Time|
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Citations of this work BETA
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Qiufang Fu, Zoltán Dienes & Xiaolan Fu (2010). Can Unconscious Knowledge Allow Control in Sequence Learning? Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):462-474.
Lois Isenman (2009). Digestive Enzyme Secretion, Intuition, and the History of Science: Part II. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 14 (4):331-349.
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