Online research in philosophy

Everett’s pure wave mechanics and the notion of worlds Content Type Journal Article Pages 277-302 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0023-9 Authors Jeffrey A. Barrett, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697, USA Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.

Emerging sciences and new conceptions of disease; or, beyond the monogenomic differentiated cell lineage Content Type Journal Article Pages 119-131 DOI 10.1007/s13194-010-0008-0 Authors John Dupré, Egenis, University of Exeter, Exeter, EX4 4PJ UK Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 1.

Theory-dependence, warranted reference, and the epistemic dimensions of realism Content Type Journal Article Pages 173-191 DOI 10.1007/s13194-010-0004-4 Authors Frederick Kroon, Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland Mail Centre, Auckland, 1142 New Zealand Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.

In pursuit of resistance: pragmatic recommendations for doing science within one’s means Content Type Journal Article Category Original paper in Philosophy of Science Pages 353-371 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0030-x Authors Amy McLaughlin, Harriet L. Wilkes Honors College, Florida Atlantic University, Jupiter, FL, USA Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 3.

The context distinction: controversies over feminist philosophy of science Content Type Journal Article Category Original paper in Philosophy of Science Pages 373-392 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0031-9 Authors Monica Aufrecht, Linfield College, McMinnville, OR, USA Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 3.

Carnap’s ramseyfications defended Content Type Journal Article Pages 71-87 DOI 10.1007/s13194-010-0003-5 Authors Thomas Uebel, Philosophy, School of Social Science, University of Manchester, Manchester, M13 9PL UK Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 1.

Newton's methodology is significantly richer than the hypothetico-deductive model. It is informed by a richer ideal of empirical success that requires not just accurate prediction but also accurate measurement of parameters by the predicted phenomena. It accepts theory-mediated measurements and theoretical propositions as guides to research. All of these enrichments are exemplified in the classical response to Mercury's perihelion problem. Contrary to Kuhn, Newton's method endorses the radical transition from his theory to Einstein's. The richer themes of Newton's method are strikingly realized in a challenge to general relativity from a new problem posed by Mercury's perihelion. †To contact the author, please write to: Talbot College, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7; e-mail: wlharp@uwo.ca.

Genuinely collective emotions Content Type Journal Article Pages 89-118 DOI 10.1007/s13194-010-0006-2 Authors Bryce Huebner, Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC USA Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 1.

Explanation and understanding Content Type Journal Article Pages 29-38 DOI 10.1007/s13194-010-0002-6 Authors Angela Potochnik, University of Cincinnati, P.O. Box 210374, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0374, USA Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 1.

The use of the material theory of induction to vindicate a scientist’s claims of evidential warrant is illustrated with the cases of Einstein’s thermodynamic argument for light quanta of 1905 and his recovery of the anomalous motion of Mercury from general relativity in 1915. In a survey of other accounts of inductive inference applied to these examples, I show that, if it is to succeed, each account must presume the same material facts as the material theory and, in addition, some general principle of inductive inference not invoked by the material theory. Hence these principles are superfluous and the material theory superior in being more parsimonious.