David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 150 (2):185 - 207 (2006)
That past patterns may continue in many different ways has long been identified as a problem for accounts of induction. The novelty of Goodman’s ”new riddle of induction” lies in a meta-argument that purports to show that no account of induction can discriminate between incompatible continuations. That meta-argument depends on the perfect symmetry of the definitions of grue/bleen and green/blue, so that any evidence that favors the ordinary continuation must equally favor the grue-ified continuation. I argue that this very dependence on the perfect symmetry defeats the novelty of the new riddle. The symmetry can be obtained in contrived circumstances, such as when we grue-ify our total science. However, in all such cases, we cannot preclude the possibility that the original and grue-ified descriptions are merely notationally variant descriptions of the same physical facts; or if there are facts that separate them, these facts are ineffable, so that no account of induction should be expected to pick between them. In ordinary circumstances, there are facts that distinguish the regular and grue-ified descriptions. Since accounts of induction can and do call upon these facts, Goodman’s meta-argument cannot provide principled grounds for the failure of all accounts of induction. It assures us only of the failure of accounts of induction, such as unaugmented enumerative induction, that cannot exploit these symmetry breaking facts.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
John D. Norton (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
John Earman & John Norton (1987). What Price Spacetime Substantivalism? The Hole Story. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):515-525.
Willard V. Quine (1969). Natural Kinds. In Jaegwon Kim & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press 114-38.
Citations of this work BETA
Alexander R. Pruss (2014). Independent Tests and the Log‐Likelihood‐Ratio Measure of Confirmation. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):124-135.
Kenneth Boyce (2014). On the Equivalence of Goodman’s and Hempel’s Paradoxes. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):32-42.
Similar books and articles
John Moreland (1976). On Projecting Grue. Philosophy of Science 43 (3):363-377.
Rosemarie Rheinwald (1993). An Epistemic Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Synthese 95 (1):55 - 76.
Robert Kowalenko (2012). Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophia 40 (3):549-552.
Edward S. Shirley (1981). An Unnoticed Flaw in Barker and Achinstein's Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Philosophy of Science 48 (4):611-617.
Adina L. Roskies (2008). Robustness and the New Riddle Revived. Ratio 21 (2):218–230.
Rainer Gottlob (1995). Emeralds Are No Chameleons — Why “Grue” is Not Projectible for Induction. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (2):259 - 268.
Daniel Steel, Mind Changes and Testability: How Formal and Statistical Learning Theory Converge in the New Riddle of Induction.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads149 ( #24,463 of 1,796,225 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #51,312 of 1,796,225 )
How can I increase my downloads?