Is there an independent principle of causality in physics?

Abstract
Mathias Frisch has argued that the requirement that electromagnetic dispersion processes are causal adds empirical content not found in electrodynamic theory. I urge that this attempt to reconstitute a local principle of causality in physics fails. An independent principle is not needed to recover the results of dispersion theory. The use of ‘causality conditions’ proves to be the mere adding of causal labels to an already presumed fact. If instead one seeks a broader, independently formulated grounding for the conditions, that grounding either fails or dissolves into vagueness and ambiguity, as has traditionally been the fate of candidate principles of causality. Introduction Scattering in Classical Electrodynamics Sufficiency of the Physics Failure of the Principle of Causality Proposed 4.1 A sometimes principle 4.2 The conditions of applicability are obscure 4.3 Effects can come before their causes 4.4 Vagueness of the relata and of the notion of causal process Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Arntzenius (1990). Causal Paradoxes in Special Relativity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (2):223-243.
Mathias Frisch (2009). 'The Most Sacred Tenet'? Causal Reasoning in Physics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):459-474.
Citations of this work BETA
Steven French (2012). Unitary Inequivalence as a Problem for Structural Realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 43 (2):121-136.
Mathias Frisch (2012). No Place for Causes? Causal Skepticism in Physics. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):313-336.
Haines Brown (2014). A Process Ontology. Axiomathes 24 (3):291-312.

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