David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 150 (1):1 - 20 (2010)
A definition of causation as probability-raising is threatened by two kinds of counterexample: first, when a cause lowers the probability of its effect; and second, when the probability of an effect is raised by a non-cause. In this paper, I present an account that deals successfully with problem cases of both these kinds. In doing so, I also explore some novel implications of incorporating into the metaphysical investigation considerations of causal psychology
|Keywords||Causation Probability Psychology Determinism Ex post Ex ante|
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen Barker (2004). Analysing Chancy Causation Without Appeal to Chance-Raising. In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
Nancy Cartwright (1979). Causal Laws and Effective Strategies. Noûs 13 (4):419-437.
Phil Dowe (2004). Chance-Lowering Causes. In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
Dorothy Edgington (2004). Counterfactuals and the Benefit of Hindsight. In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Northcott (2013). Degree of Explanation. Synthese 190 (15):3087-3105.
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