Natural-born deterministe: a new defense of causation as probability-raising

Philosophical Studies 150 (1):1 - 20 (2010)
Abstract
A definition of causation as probability-raising is threatened by two kinds of counterexample: first, when a cause lowers the probability of its effect; and second, when the probability of an effect is raised by a non-cause. In this paper, I present an account that deals successfully with problem cases of both these kinds. In doing so, I also explore some novel implications of incorporating into the metaphysical investigation considerations of causal psychology
Keywords Causation  Probability  Psychology  Determinism  Ex post  Ex ante
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour & Richard Scheines (1996). Causation, Prediction, and Search. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):113-123.

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