Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1139-1151 (2004)
|Abstract||Thought experiments in science are merely picturesque argumentation. I support this view in various ways, including the claim that it follows from the fact that thought experiments can err but can still be used reliably. The view is defended against alternatives proposed by my cosymposiasts.|
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