Persistent propensities: Portrait of a familiar controversy [Book Review]

Biology and Philosophy 5 (4):379-399 (1990)
Susan Mills and John Beatty's propensity interpretation of fitness encountered very different philosophical criticisms by Alexander Rosenberg and Kenneth Waters. These criticisms and the rejoinders to them are both predictable and important. They are predictable as raisingkinds of issues typically associated with disposition concepts (this is established through a systematic review of the problems generated by Carnap's dispositional interpretation of all scientific terms). They are important as referring the resolution of these issues to the development of evolutionary biology. This historical approach to the propensity interpretation of fitness draws attention to the precarious relation between philosophical clarification of scientific concepts and any given state of the empirical arts.
Keywords Fitness  dispositions and propensities  Carnap  historiography of science  history of the philosophy of science
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References found in this work BETA
John Beatty (1982). The Insights and Oversights of Molecular Genetics: The Place of the Evolutionary Perspective. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:341 - 355.
Robert N. Brandon (1980). A Structural Description of Evolutionary Theory. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:427 - 439.
Rudolf Carnap (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.

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