Ryle on 'the problem of the self'

Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 19:220-235 (1970)
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Abstract

THE nature of the self and of self knowledge is a problem that has not ceased to intrigue and perplex philosophers since the day that Socrates made his own the Delphic precept ‘Know Thyself’. It has been of particular interest to philosophers, however, since Descartes took the Cogito as the basis of his philosophy. In modern times we have only to think of Hume’s vain search for the self, of Kant’s transcendental apperception, and of Fichte’s Ego. And in contemporary times we have before us the descriptions that Husserl and Sartre have given of the constitution of the ego, and the enigmatic remarks that Wittgenstein makes in his Tractatus about the subject being the limit of the world.

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