There Are No Universal Rules for Induction

Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777 (2010)
Abstract
In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are warranted by facts that prevail locally. This approach, it is urged, is preferable to formal theories of induction in which the good inductive inferences are delineated as those conforming to some universal schema. An inductive inference problem concerning indeterministic, non-probabilistic systems in physics is posed and it is argued that Bayesians cannot responsibly analyze it, thereby demonstrating that the probability calculus is not the universal logic of induction.
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References found in this work BETA
John Norton (1999). A Quantum Mechanical Supertask. Foundations of Physics 29 (8):1265-1302.
John Norton (2008). Ignorance and Indifference. Philosophy of Science 75 (1):45-68.
John D. Norton (2007). Probability Disassembled. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):141 - 171.
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