Online research in philosophy

Medicine is arriving at a new millenium. One of its most urgent tasks is to reconcile social health demands with a renewed medical paradigm capable of including them. This challenge requires a reexamination of the definition of medicine.This work takes up the original greek definition of medicine (Tekhne Iatrike) and the Medical Act according to P. Lain Entrago, and analyzes Heidegger's interpretation of Tekhne. It points out the two main ways in which current medical practice is sustained: the Instrumental Medical Act (IMA), which organizes medical production, and the Productive Medical Act (PMA), which motivates it.

The aim of the paper is to examine the possible relationships between the different dimensions of aesthetics on the one hand, and medical practice and medical ethics on the other hand. Firstly, I consider whether the aesthetic perception of the human body is relevant for medical practice. Secondly, a possible analogy between the artistic process and medical action is examined. The third section concerns the comparison between medical ethical judgements and aesthetic judgement of taste. It is concluded that the mutual relevance between the aesthetic sphere, moral judgement and medical practice can be understood only if we recognize these spheres as distinct.

This article examines whether cosmetic interventions by dentists and plastic surgeons are medically indicated and, hence, qualify as medical interventions proper. Cosmetic interventions (and the business strategies used to market them) are often frowned upon by dentists and physicians. However, if those interventions do not qualify as medical interventions proper, they should not be evaluated using medical-ethical norms. On the other hand, if they are to be considered medical practice proper, the medical-ethical principles of nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice and others hold true for cosmetic interventions as much as they do for other medical and dental interventions. It is concluded that most cosmetic interventions do not qualify as medical interventions proper because they do not restore or maintain the patient's health (defined as the patient's integrity) by any objective standards. Rather, cosmetic interventions are intended to enhance a person's physical appearance; more specifically, they intend to fulfill the client's subjective perception of an enhanced appearance.

A basic question of medical ethics is whether the norms governing medical practice should be understood as the application of principles and rules of the common morality to medicine or whether some of these norms are internal or proper to medicine. In this article we describe and defend an evolutionary perspective on the internal morality of medicine that is defined in terms of the goals of clinical medicine and a set of duties that constrain medical practice in pursuit of these goals. This perspective is developed by means of a critical examination of the essentialist conception of the internal morality of medicine advocated by Edmund Pellegrino and the critique of internal morality approaches by Robert Veatch and Tom Beauchamp.

In the late twentieth century the impressive achievements of modern medicine are obvious, yet medicine seems to have failed to satisfy public expectation. Government regulation of hospitals and doctors is tightening in most Western countries and health funding is a divisive political issue. Medical complaints departments are increasingly busy. In the United States medical litigation has reached alarming levels, and a similar trend can be seen in other developed countries. Is there something wrong with medical research and practice? This book, written by a surgeon with more than thirty years experience of clinical medicine, examines what it is that doctors do, and what it is that patients expect of them. It finds that in the face of uncertainty, expectation and reality ofen often diverge. Starting from the communication difficulties that exist between doctors and patients, Humane Medicine explores the roles of science, ethics and the humanities in medical practice. It forcefully argues that more science cannot heal this rift, nor can better education in ethics. To foster better communication, medical teachers must change their philosophy and methods, so that value-laden issues in clinical medicine are interwoven with the necessary science. Professor Little outlines some possible ways to achieve this. This important book will be of interest to medical students and their teachers, clinicians, health policy planners and other readers concerned about the direction of the medical profession.

In recent years, virtue theories have enjoyed a renaissance of interest among general and medical ethicists. This book offers a virtue-based ethic for medicine, the health professions, and health care. Beginning with a historical account of the concept of virtue, the authors construct a theory of the place of the virtues in medical practice. Their theory is grounded in the nature and ends of medicine as a special kind of human activity. The concepts of virtue, the virtues, and the virtuous physician are examined along with the place of the virtues of trust, compassion, prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and effacement of self-interest in medicine. The authors discuss the relationship between and among principles, rules, virtues, and the philosophy of medicine. They also address the difference virtue-based ethics makes in confronting such practical problems as care of the poor, research with human subjects, and the conduct of the healing relationship. This book woith the author's previous volumes, A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice and For the Patient's Good, are part of their continuing project of developing a coherent moral philosophy of medicine.

In spite of the seminal work A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice, the debate on the task and goals of philosophy of medicine still continues. From an European perspective it is argued that the main topics dealt with by Pellegrino and Thomasma are still particularly relevant to medical practice as a healing practice, while expressing the need for a philosophy of medicine. Medical practice is a discursive practice which is highly influenced by other discursive practices like science, law and economics. Philosophical analysis of those influences is needed to discern their effect on the goals of medicine and on the ways in which the self-image of man may be changed. The nature of medical practice and discourse itself makes it necessary to include different philosophical disciplines, like philosophy of science, of law, ethics, and epistemology. Possible scenario's of euthanasia and the human genome project in the USA and Europe are used to exemplify how philosopy of medicine can contribute to a realistic understanding of the problems which are related to the goals of medicine and health care.

For decades, health professionals have asserted the importance of public participation in interventions for health. Medicine has pursued patient participation in clinical decision-making. In the public health realm, target groups have been asked to assist in the design and implementation of initiatives for health. In practice, however, patients and populations expect health professionals to give advice and - in some cases - to make decisions on their behalf. This implies limits to the ideal of participation. In this innovative work, the author contrasts public and professional understandings of health and the best ways to achieve health. The result is a model of lay participation in the structuring of medical and public health activity. The book is unique due to its policy-applicable, quantitative studies and its theoretical analysis of works by René Dubos and Aaron Antonovsky. It will be of value to professionals in health promotion, health education, medical anthropology, and social epidemiology.

One problematic aspect of the rationality of medical practice concerns the relation between expert knowledge and non-expert knowledge. In medical practice it is important to match medical knowledge with the self-knowledge of the individual patient. This paper tries to study the problem of such matching by describing a model for technological paradigms and comparing it with an ideal of technological rationality. The professionalised experts tend to base their decisions and actions mostly on medical knowledge while the rationality of medicine also involves just as important elements of the personal evaluation and knowledge of the patients. Since both types of knowledge are necessary for rational decisions, the gap between the expert and the non-expert has to be bridged in some way. A solution to the problem is suggested in terms of pluralism, with the patient as ultimate decision-maker.