Vier Philosophen über semantische Paradoxien

History and Philosophy of Logic 16 (2):217-244 (1995)
In his treatise on sophisms, the medieval logician and philosopher J. Buridan expounded a theory on what we have come to call semantic paradoxes. His theory has not yet been fully understood. The present paper aims at showing that Barwise's and Etchemendy's considerations on paradoxes (founded upon Aczel's non-well-founded sets) provide the framework for an improved understanding. Barwise's and Etchemendy's account is contrasted with Kripke's. Finally, a recent analysis of Buridan's position by Epstein is criticized.
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DOI 10.1080/01445349508837250
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Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.

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