David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Acta Analytica 22 (2):105-124 (2007)
In this paper I discuss the claim that believing at will is ‘conceptually impossible’ or, to use a formulation encountered in the debate, “that nothing could be a belief and be willed directly”. I argue that such a claim is only plausible if directed against the claim that believing itself is an action-type. However, in the debate, the claim has been univocally directed against the position that forming a belief is an action-type. I argue that the many arguments offered in favor of the ‘conceptual impossibility’ of performing such actions fail without exception. If we are to argue against doxastic voluntarism we are better off by resorting to more modest means.
|Keywords||Doxastic voluntarism Genetic version Conceptual impossibility Epistemic deontology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
Bas C. van Fraassen (2010). Belief and the Will. In Antony Eagle (ed.), Journal of Philosophy. Routledge 235-256.
Brian O'Shaughnessy (2008). The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory. Cambridge University Press.
James Montmarquet (1993). Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility. Rowman & Littlefield.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Bart Streumer (2010). Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):79 - 86.
Dana Radcliffe (1997). Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):145-151.
Zoltán Gendler Szabó (2003). Believing in Things. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611.
Dana Radcliffe (1997). Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):145 - 151.
Pascal Engel (1998). Believing, Holding True, and Accepting. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140 – 151.
Josefa Toribio (2003). Free Belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):327-36.
Adam Kovach (2006). Epistemic Virtues and the Deliberative Frame of Mind. Social Epistemology 20 (1):105 – 115.
Bart Streumer (2007). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
John N. Williams (2009). Justifying Circumstances and Moore-Paradoxical Beliefs: A Response to Brueckner. Analysis 69 (3):490-496.
Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads50 ( #83,897 of 1,796,206 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #170,530 of 1,796,206 )
How can I increase my downloads?