'Sociale vrede' als Kelseniaanse voorstelling van rechterlijke rechtvaardigheid

Rechtsfilosofie and Rechtstheorie 37 (1):49-70 (2008)
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Abstract

Research into Kelsen’s conception of judicial justice seems at first sight contradictory to his own Pure Theory of Law. Upon closer consideration this prima facie contradiction turns out to be only an appearance due to the paradoxical effect that is produced by Kelsen’s pure theory of law itself. By revealing three paradoxical effects of Kelsen’s work in this article, I try to show that research into a Kelsenian representation of judicial justice is not only possible but also meaningful. The first paradox originates from Kelsen’s formalised and value-free concept of law, which unexpectedly confronts the judge with his moral responsibility for the material valuation of the law. Secondly, a paradox arises from Kelsen’s rationalised notion of relative justice, which in fact forces the judge to be absolutely convinced of the moral rightness of his judgement. The third paradox is a result of Kelsen’s idea of objectivised ‘social peace’, by which the judge just realises the subjective and irrational demands of justice. From my analysis of these three seeming contradictions in Kelsen’s pure theory of law emerges an apparent Kelsenian representation of judicial justice. Starting from his pure theory of law it should be possible to conceive of a ‘pure’ form of administration of law, which would stipulate social peace as a condition for the ‘purity’ of a judicial judgement. I even imagine that Kelsen considered peace as a conditio tacita for the validity of the whole legal order, just as he regarded the basic norm as conditio per quam and effectivity as conditio sine qua non for the validity of the legal order. In any case, according to Kelsen’s conception of judicial justice, social peace proves to be the implicit or tacit condition for a ‘pure’ judgement. With that this ‘pacifying jurisprudence’ can be understood as a surprising paragon of a ‘pure’ administration of justice, on the understanding that peace is not a sufficient but an obvious condition for a just administration of law. That this should also apply mutatis mutandis for Kelsen’s concept of the legal order as a whole will be made subject of further research.

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Mathijs Notermans
Maastricht University

References found in this work

Lecture on Ethics.Ludwig Wittgenstein (ed.) - 2014 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
General theory of law and state.Hans Kelsen - 1945 - Union, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange. Edited by Hans Kelsen.
General Theory of Law and State.Milton R. Konvitz - 1947 - Philosophical Review 56 (2):221.

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