The analogy argument for doxastic voluntarism

Philosophical Studies 131 (3):559 - 582 (2006)
Abstract
An influential version of doxastic voluntarism claims that doxastic events such as belief-formations at least sometimes qualify as actions. William Alston has made a simple response to this claim by arguing on empirical grounds that in normal human agents intentions to form specific beliefs are simply powerless. However, despite Alston’s observation, various authors have insisted that belief-formations may qualify as voluntary in perfect analogy to certain types of actions or even to actions in general. I examine three analogy arguments of this type and argue that they all fail.
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Carl Ginet (2001). Deciding to Believe. In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty. Oxford University Press. 63-76.

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