Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (4):389-434 (1998)
|Abstract||I extract several common assumptions in the Classical Theory of Mind (CTM) - mainly of Locke and Descartes - and work out a partial formalisation of the logic implicit in CTM. I then define the modal (logical) properties and relations of propositions, including the modality of conditional propositions and the validity of argument, according to the principles of CTM: that is, in terms of clear and distinct ideas, and without any reference to either possible worlds, or deducibility in an axiomatic system, or linguistic convention|
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