Lessons on truth from mediaeval solutions to the liar paradox

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):58-78 (2011)
Abstract
Some fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family offer a promising starting-point for the formulation of full-fledged theories of truth with systematic relevance in their own right. In particular, Bradwardine's thesis that sentences typically say more than one thing gives rise to a quantificational approach to truth, and Buridan's theory of truth based on the notion of suppositio allows for remarkable metaphysical parsimony. Bradwardine's and Buridan's theories both have theoretical advantages, but fail to provide a satisfactory account of truth because both are committed to the thesis, fatal for both, that every sentence signifies/implies its own truth. I close with remarks on Greg Restall's recent model-theoretic formalization of Bradwardine's theory of truth
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    Miroslav Hanke (2013). Implied-Meaning Analysis of the Currian Conditional. History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (4):367 - 380.
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