Graduate studies at Western
Axiomathes 17 (1):41-51 (2007)
|Abstract||According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true|
|Keywords||Physicalism/Naturalism Reduction Mind–Body problem Searle’s ontology|
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