Searle on the unity of the world

Axiomathes 17 (1):41-51 (2007)
Abstract
According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true
Keywords Physicalism/Naturalism  Reduction  Mind–Body problem  Searle’s ontology
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References found in this work BETA
N. Fotion (2000). John Searle. Princeton University Press.

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David Hodgson (1994). Why Searle has Not Rediscovered the Mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):264-274.
John R. Searle (2002). Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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