Against Voluntarism

Philosophia Christi 12 (2):335-356 (2010)
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Abstract

The will, while free, is nonetheless subject to natural necessity: when presented with its object, the will necessarily chooses that which reason judges to be better. A presumption in favor of this view, which we call intellectualism, is established by eliminating its main rival, namely, an indifference theory of the will, which we call voluntarism. William of Ockham, who holds a sophisticated indifference theory, is adduced as an example. Criticisms leveled against Ockham apply, mutatis mutandis, to other voluntarist-inspired accounts.

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