David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Metaphilosophy 40 (2):180-186 (2009)
Abstract: Some seventy years ago, G. E. Moore invoked his own sensory experience (as of a hand before him in the right circumstances), added some philosophical analysis about externality, and took himself to have offered his "Proof" of the existence of an external world. Current neo-Mooreans either reject completely the standard negative assessment of the Proof or qualify it substantially. For Sosa, the Proof can be persuasive, but only when read literally as offering reasons for the conclusion that there is at least one external object—rather than that the prover is justified in believing, or even knowing, that there is at least one external object. Sosa, then, is a neo-Moorean—though not of the sort we might expect in light of the ongoing debate about the Proof. I argue that Sosa needs to say more about the circularity often thought to vitiate the Proof before we can accept his view.
|Keywords||Moore's Proof begging the question neo‐Mooreanism transmission of warrant idealism skepticism|
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References found in this work BETA
James Pryor (2000). The Skeptic and the Dogmatist. Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Crispin Wright (2002). (Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
Frank Jackson (1987). Conditionals. Blackwell.
Crispin Wright (2002). (Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
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