Common-Sense and Scientific Psychology

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):171-180 (2001)
In this paper I discuss the circumstances in which it would be right to revise a common-sense psychological categorisation -- such as the common-sense categorisation of emotions -- in the light of the results of empirical investigation. I argue that an answer to that question, familiar from eliminitivist arguments, should be rejected, and suggest that the issue turns on the ontological commitments of the explanations that common-sense psychological states enter into
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DOI croatjphil20011218
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