Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):31-51 (2004)
|Abstract||Standard accounts of the senses attempt to answer the question how and why we count ?ve senses (the counting question); none of the standard accounts is satisfactory. Any adequate account of the senses must explain the signi?cance of the senses, that is, why distinguishing different senses matters. I provide such an explanation, and then use it as the basis for providing an account of the senses and answering the counting question|
|Keywords||Aetiology Epistemology Experience Perceiving Perception Sense|
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