David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Continental Philosophy Review 31 (3):273-291 (1998)
This paper will address one of the “unsolved” problems that has traditionally been called the “form/content” dualism. Husserl writes in Ideas I: “This remarkable duality and unity of sensory hyle and intentional morphe plays a dominant role in the whole phenomenological sphere (in the whole sphere, namely within the stage of constituting temporality, which can be constantly verified)” (Hua III, 192). To be sure, Husserl has defined the sensory hyle “descriptively” as the really immanent [reell] part of consciousness with differences of color, sound, touch and so on, as well as “functionally” as something that can become an adumbration or an aspect of objects through the animating apprehension of active consciousness. But the constitution of an object in his later analysis is clarified more and more in terms of noematic unification (Holenstein, 93), which obscures the function of hyle in the process of constitution.
|Keywords||dualism active consciousness constitution|
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Matt Bower (2014). Affectively Driven Perception: Toward a Non-Representational Phenomenology. Husserl Studies 30 (3):225-245.
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