The ontology of intentionality II: Dependence ontology as prolegomenon to noetic modal semantics [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Husserl Studies 23 (2):119-159 (2007)
This is the second in a sequence of three essays which axiomatize and apply Edmund Husserl's dependence ontology of parts and wholes as a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal semantics for first-order predicate modal languages. The Ontology of Intentionality I introduced enough of Husserl's dependence-ontology of parts and wholes to formulate his account of order as effected by relating moments of unity, and The Ontology of Intentionality II extends that axiomatic dependence-ontology far enough to enable its semantic application. Formalizing the compatibility [Vereinbarkeit] relation implicated in Husserl's notorious doctrine of impossible meanings, the essay introduces a compatibility restriction on relations to formulate Husserl's distinction between singular [einheitliche] and plural [mehrheitliche] objects, using plural relating moments to define first-order versions of Husserl's notions of relation complexes (i.e. Sachverhalte), abstracta of n-ary relation complexes, categorial relations, abstract eide as unifications of categorial relations, semantic domains as completions of abstract eide, and material regions as semantic domains which are compatibility upper bounds of categorial relations. These concepts will enable the formal dependence-ontological noetic semantics for two-valued, first-order modal languages introduced in the sequel Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality, the third essay in the sequence
|Keywords||Collective realism Dependence Formal semantics Husserl Intentionality Intensionality Individuals Mereology Moments of unity Part -whole Pieces Plurality Ontology Relations Unity Universals Urelements Zermelo|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
D. W. Mertz (1996). Moderate Realism and its Logic. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Aron Gurwitsch (1964). The Field of Consciousness. Duquesne University Press.
Alfred Tarski (1936/1956). The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages. In A. Tarski (ed.), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford University Press 152--278.
Alfred J. Freddoso (1978). Abailard on Collective Realism. Journal of Philosophy 75 (10):527-538.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
William J. Greenberg (1996). The Paradox of Identity. Epistemologia (2):207-226.
David Woodruff Smith (2004). Mind World : Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology. Cambridge University Press.
Kanti Lal Das & Anirban Mukherjee (eds.) (2008). Language and Ontology. Northern Book Centre.
Mariano Rodr´Iguez, Toward Using Bio-Ontologies in the Semantic Web: Trade-Offs Between Ontology Languages.
Daniel von Wachter (2005). Roman Ingarden’s Ontology: Existential Dependence, Substances, Ideas, and Other Things Empiricists Do Not Like. In A. Chrudzimski (ed.), Existence, Culture, and Persons: The Ontology of Roman Ingarden. Ontos
Barry Smith & Kevin Mulligan (1983). Framework for Formal Ontology. Topoi 2 (1):73-85.
Łukasz Kosowski (2010). Noema and Thinkability : An Essay on Husserl's Theory of Intentionality. Ontos Verlag.
Roberto Poli (1993). Husserl's Conception of Formal Ontology. History and Philosophy of Logic 14 (1):1-14.
Gilbert T. Null (2007). The Ontology of Intentionality I: The Dependence Ontological Account of Order: Mediate and Immediate Moments and Pieces of Dependent and Independent Objects. Husserl Studies 23 (1):33-69.
Gilbert T. Null (2007). Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality: Temporality, Truth, Modality, and Identity. Husserl Studies 23 (3):187-228.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads29 ( #106,438 of 1,724,796 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #210,938 of 1,724,796 )
How can I increase my downloads?