Mind and Society 11 (1):15-26 (2012)
|Abstract||It has been argued that dual process theories are not consistent with Oaksford and Chater’s probabilistic approach to human reasoning (Oaksford and Chater in Psychol Rev 101:608–631, 1994 , 2007 ; Oaksford et al. 2000 ), which has been characterised as a “single-level probabilistic treatment[s]” (Evans 2007 ). In this paper, it is argued that this characterisation conflates levels of computational explanation. The probabilistic approach is a computational level theory which is consistent with theories of general cognitive architecture that invoke a WM system and an LTM system. That is, it is a single function dual process theory which is consistent with dual process theories like Evans’ ( 2007 ) that use probability logic (Adams 1998 ) as an account of analytic processes. This approach contrasts with dual process theories which propose an analytic system that respects standard binary truth functional logic (Heit and Rotello in J Exp Psychol Learn 36:805–812, 2010 ; Klauer et al. in J Exp Psychol Learn 36:298–323, 2010 ; Rips in Psychol Sci 12:29–134, 2001 , 2002 ; Stanovich in Behav Brain Sci 23:645–726, 2000 , 2011 ). The problems noted for this latter approach by both Evans Psychol Bull 128:978–996, ( 2002 , 2007 ) and Oaksford and Chater (Mind Lang 6:1–38, 1991 , 1998 , 2007 ) due to the defeasibility of everyday reasoning are rehearsed. Oaksford and Chater’s ( 2010 ) dual systems implementation of their probabilistic approach is then outlined and its implications discussed. In particular, the nature of cognitive decoupling operations are discussed and a Panglossian probabilistic position developed that can explain both modal and non-modal responses and correlations with IQ in reasoning tasks. It is concluded that a single function probabilistic approach is as compatible with the evidence supporting a dual systems theory|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Richard Samuels (2009). The Magical Number Two, Plus or Minus: Dual Process Theory as a Theory of Cognitive Kinds. In Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
Shira Elqayam (2011). Models of Dependence and Independence: A Two-Dimensional Architecture of Dual Processing. Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):377-387.
Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (2009). Précis of Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):69-84.
Shira Elqayam & David Over (2012). Probabilities, Beliefs, and Dual Processing: The Paradigm Shift in the Psychology of Reasoning. Mind and Society 11 (1):27-40.
Guillaume Beaulac (2010). A Two Speed Mind? For a Heuristic Interpretation of Dual-Process Theories (L'esprit à Deux Vitesses ? Pour Une Interprétation Heuristique des Théories à Processus Duaux). Dissertation, Université du Québec à Montréal
Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.) (2008). The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science. OUP Oxford.
Niki Verschueren, Walter Schaeken & G. (2005). A Dual-Process Specification of Causal Conditional Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 11 (3):239 – 278.
Linda A. W. Brakel & Howard Shevrin (2003). Freud's Dual Process Theory and the Place of the a-Rational. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):527-528.
Peter Carruthers (2008). An Architecture for Dual Reasoning. In J. Evans & K. Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
Mike Oaksford (1998). Discussion Task Demands and Revising Probabilities in the Selection Task: A Comment on Green, Over, and Pyne. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (2):179 – 186.
Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (2007). Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning. OUP Oxford.
Shira Elqayam & Jonathan Evans (2011). Subtracting “Ought” From “Is”: Descriptivism Versus Normativism in the Study of Human Thinking. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 34 (05):251-252.
Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over (2002). The Role of Language in the Dual Process Theory of Thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):684-685.
Added to index2012-01-07
Total downloads6 ( #154,629 of 722,731 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,731 )
How can I increase my downloads?