Synthese 107 (2):205 - 221 (1996)
|Abstract||Since McTaggart first proposed his paradox asserting the unreality of time, numerous philosophers have attempted to defend the tensed theory of time against it. Certainly, one of the most highly developed and original is that put forth by Quentin Smith. Through discussing McTaggart's positive conception of time as well as his negative attack on its reality, I hope to clarify the dispute between those who believe in the existence of the transitory temporal properties of pastness, presentness and futurity, and those who deny their existence. We shall see that the debate centers around the ontological status of succession and the B-relations of earlier and later. I shall argue that Smith's tensed theory fails because he cannot account for the sense in which events have their tensed properties successively, and he cannot account for the direction of time.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael J. Futch (2002). Leibniz's Non-Tensed Theory of Time. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):125 – 139.
D. H. Mellor (1998). Transcendental Tense: D.H. Mellor. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):29–44.
L. A. Paul (1997). Truth Conditions of Tensed Sentence Types. Synthese 111 (1):53-72.
D. H. Mellor (1998). Transcendental Tense. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72:29 - 56.
Quentin Smith (1993). Language and Time. Oxford University Press.
Joshua M. Mozersky (2000). Tense and Temporal Semantics. Synthese 124 (2):257-279.
Michael Tooley (2010). Farewell to Mctaggart's Argument? Philosophia 38 (2).
Heather Dyke (2001). The Pervasive Paradox of Tense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):103-124.
Josh Parsons (2002). A-Theory for B-Theorists. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):1-20.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads50 ( #21,197 of 551,055 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #12,467 of 551,055 )
How can I increase my downloads?