David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 38 (2):229-241 (2010)
In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a ) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis of temporal becoming, temporal properties and temporal relations is inadequate. Finally, in Part III, I shall demonstrate that his presentist ontology of time is susceptible to the paradox he so assiduously sought to avoid.
|Keywords||McTaggart Presentism Time Ersatz B-relations Temporal becoming|
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas M. Crisp (2007). Presentism and the Grounding Objection. Noûs 41 (1):90–109.
Michael Tooley (1997). Time, Tense, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
William Lane Craig (1998). Mctaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Analysis 58 (2):122–127.
Michael Tooley (2010). Farewell to Mctaggart's Argument? Philosophia 38 (2):243-255.
L. Nathan Oaklander (2002). Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:73-.
Citations of this work BETA
Francesco Orilia (2012). Dynamic Events and Presentism. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):407-414.
Francesco Orilia (2016). Moderate Presentism. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):589-607.
Emiliano Boccardi (2015). If It Ain’T Moving It Shall Not Be Moved. Topoi 34 (1):171-185.
Daniel Padgett & T. Ryan Byerly (2014). Reconstituting Ersatzer Presentism. Res Philosophica 91 (3):491-502.
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