Mctaggart's paradox and Crisp's presentism

Philosophia 38 (2):229-241 (2010)
Abstract
In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a ) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis of temporal becoming, temporal properties and temporal relations is inadequate. Finally, in Part III, I shall demonstrate that his presentist ontology of time is susceptible to the paradox he so assiduously sought to avoid.
Keywords McTaggart  Presentism  Time  Ersatz B-relations  Temporal becoming
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    References found in this work BETA
    L. Nathan Oaklander (2002). Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:73-.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Francesco Orilia (2012). Dynamic Events and Presentism. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):407-414.
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