On an account of our analyticity judgements

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):124 – 130 (1972)
I discuss and criticise Douglas Gasking’s paper, “The Analytic-Synthetic Controversy” (in the current issue of this journal). Gasking proposes an explanation of our classifying together as “analytic” statements like “Someone is a bachelor if and only if he is an unmarried man”. He proposes that the feature common to the statements that we so classify is that they provide the only “semantic anchor” for a word that does not have, in Quine’s terms, a socially constant stimulus meaning. I argue that, even after modifications are introduced to allow the account to handle certain difficulties, the account falls to some fatal objections.
Keywords Analytic  Analyticity  Douglas Gasking  Hilary Putnam  W.V.O. Quine
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DOI 10.1080/00048407212341151
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Hilary Putnam (1967). The Analytic and the Synthetic. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 1 (2):109-113.

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