Incommensurability, realism, and meta-incommensurability

Theoria 12 (3):447-465 (1997)
Abstract
The essay begins with a detailed consideration of the introduction of incommensurability by Feyerabend in 1962 which exposes several historically inaccurate claims about incommensurability. Section 2 is a coneise argument against causal theories of reference as used as arguments against incommensurability. We object to this strategy because it begs the question by presupposing realism. Section 3 introduces and discusses a hypothesis that w'e call meta-incommensurability which provides the reason for the wide-spread accusation of question-begging and use of circular argumentation among the proponents of both realist and non-realist interpretations of science
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Citations of this work BETA
Howard Sankey (2009). Scientific Realism and the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 40 (2):196-202.
John Preston (1999). Author's Response. Metascience 8 (2):233-243.
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Howard Sankey (2009). Scientific Realism and the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 40 (2):196-202.
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