Lost in moral space: On the infringing/violating distinction and its place in the theory of rights [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Law and Philosophy 23 (4):325 - 346 (2004)
The infringing/violating distinction, first drawn by Judith Jarvis Thomson, is central to much contemporary rights theory. According to Thomson, conduct that is in some sense opposed to a right infringes it, while conduct that is also wrong violates the right. This distinction finds a home what I call, borrowing Robert Nozick's parlance, a "moral space" conception of rights, for the infringing/violating distinction presupposes that, as Nozick puts it, "a line (or hyper-plane) circumscribes an area in moral space around an individual." In this paper, I argue against the moral space conception of rights, and more specifically, against incorporating the infringing/violating distinction into a theory of rights. There are other compelling ways to think about rights and it is my goal to stimulate their exploration.
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Citations of this work BETA
J. D. Shepherd (2012). A Human Right Not to Be Punished? Punishment as Derogation of Rights. Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (1):31-45.
Douglas Husak (2008). Why Criminal Law: A Question of Content? [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (2):99-122.
Benjamin Sachs (2015). Direct Moral Grounding and the Legal Model of Moral Normativity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):703-716.
Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Explaining Compensatory Duties. Legal Theory 16 (2):91-110.
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