David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Thinking and Reasoning 13 (4):340 – 369 (2007)
Two experiments were conducted to investigate the roles of covariation and of causality in people's readiness to believe a conditional. The experiments used a probabilistic truth-table task (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003) in which people estimated the probability of a conditional given information about the frequency distribution of truth-table cases. For one group of people, belief in the conditional was determined by the conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent, whereas for another group it depended on the probability of the conjunction of antecedent and consequent. There was little evidence that covariation, expressed as the probabilistic contrast or as the pCI rule (White, 2003), influences belief in the conditional. The explicit presence of a causal link between antecedent and consequent in a context story had a weak positive effect on belief in a conditional when the frequency distribution of relevant cases was held constant.
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Igor Douven & Richard Dietz (2011). A Puzzle About Stalnaker's Hypothesis. Topoi 30 (1):31-37.
Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge (2013). The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited. Cognitive Science 37 (4):711-730.
Klaus Oberauer (2009). Oaksford & Chater's Theory of Reasoning: High Prior, Lower Posterior Plausibility. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):95-96.
Jonathan StB. T. Evans, Helen Neilens, Simon J. Handley & David E. Over (2008). When Can We Say 'If'? Cognition 108 (1):100-116.
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