David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):939-63 (1999)
One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in C onsciousness Explained i s to demolish the Cartesian theatre model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of C artesian materialism : the idea that conscious experience is a p rocess of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Our response is quite different. We believe that, once properly formulated, Cartesian materialism is no straw man. Rather, it is an attractive hypothesis about the relationship between the computational architecture of the brain and phenomenal consciousness, and hence one that is worthy of further exploration. Consequently, our primary aim in this paper is to defend Cartesian materialism from Dennett.
|Keywords||Cartesianism Consciousness Materialism Metaphysics|
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