David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1-2):13-38 (2001)
We think the best prospect for a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal consciousness is to be found at the confluence of two influential ideas about the mind. The first is the _computational _ _theory of mind_: the theory that treats human cognitive processes as disciplined operations over neurally realised representing vehicles.1 The second is the _representationalist theory of _ _consciousness_: the theory that takes the phenomenal character of conscious experiences (the “what-it-is-likeness”) to be constituted by their representational content.2 Together these two theories suggest that phenomenal consciousness might be explicable in terms of the representational content of the neurally realised representing vehicles that are generated and manipulated in the course of cognition. The simplest and most elegant hypothesis that one might entertain in this regard is that conscious experiences are identical to (i.e., are one and the same as) the brain’s representing vehicles
|Keywords||Connectionism Consciousness Experience Metaphysics Mind Phenomenology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Alex Morgan (2014). Representations Gone Mental. Synthese 191 (2):213-244.
Elizabeth Schier (2009). Identifying Phenomenal Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):216-222.
Similar books and articles
Greg Janzen (2006). The Representational Theory of Phenomenal Character: A Phenomenological Critique. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):321-339.
Uriah Kriegel (2006). Theories of Consciousness. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.
Uriah Kriegel (2002). PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64.
Gerard O'Brien (1989). Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content. Acta Analytica 22 (22):111-31.
Gerard O'Brien (1998). Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content. Acta Analytica 22 (22):111-31.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1997). Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.
Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-48.
Nicholas Shea (2007). Content and Its Vehicles in Connectionist Systems. Mind and Language 22 (3):246–269.
Mark Rowlands (2003). Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads39 ( #85,375 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #61,095 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?