Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge

Philosophical Studies 52 (July):49-70 (1987)
The project of the paper is a critical examination of the "strong thesis of eliminative materialism" in the philosophy of mind--The claim that all the mental entities that constitute the framework of commonsense psychology are, In principle at least, Eliminable from our ontology. The central conclusion reached is that the traditional formulation of this thesis is demonstrably untenable as it rests on a mistaken view of the relationship between our psychological self-Knowledge and language
Keywords Materialism  Mental Object  Metaphysics  Mind  Self-knowledge
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