Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):165-78 (1991)
|Abstract||In this paper I critically examine the line of reasoning that has recently appeared in the literature that connects connectionism with eliminativism. This line of reasoning has it that if connectionist models turn out accurately to characterize our cognition, then beliefs, desires and the other intentional entities of commonsense psychology will be eliminated from our theoretical ontology. In complete contrast I argue (1) that not only is this line of reasoning mistaken about the eliminativist tendencies of connectionist models, but (2) that these models have the potential to provide a more robust vindication of commonsense psychology than classical computational models|
|Keywords||Cognition Common Sense Connectionism Eliminativism Metaphysics Psychology|
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