Self-Knowing Agents

Oxford University Press (2007)
* Fascinating topic in the philosophy of mind and action * Changes the focus of, and gives fresh momentum to, current discussions of self-identification and self-reference * Rigorous discussion of rival views Lucy OBrien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. She considers two main questions. First, what account of first-person reference can we give that respects the guaranteed nature of such reference? Second, what account can we give of our knowledge of our mental and physical actions? Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action
Keywords Self-knowledge, Theory of  Agent (Philosophy  Act (Philosophy  Self-perception  Awareness  Bodily-Awareness
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2010
Buy the book $7.24 used (92% off)   $20.98 new (47% off)   $38.95 direct from Amazon    Amazon page
Call number BD438.5.O27 2007
ISBN(s) 0199592047   0199261482   9780199261482     9780199592043
DOI 10.1093/analys/ann031
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,720
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Conor McHugh (2011). Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.
Joëlle Proust (2010). Metacognition. Philosophy Compass 5 (11):989-998.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

62 ( #73,849 of 1,937,259 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #62,125 of 1,937,259 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.