David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Issues 18 (1):316-338 (2008)
Cross-modal perceptual illusions occur when a stimulus to one modality impacts perceptual experience associated with another modality. Unlike synaesthesia, cross-modal illusions are intelligible as results of perceptual strategies for dealing with sensory stimulation to multiple modalities, rather than as mere quirks. I argue that understanding cross-modal illusions reveals an important flaw in a widespread conception of the senses, and of their role in perceptual experience, according to which understanding perception and perceptual experience is a matter of assembling independently viable stories about vision, audition, olfaction, and the rest.
|Keywords||cross-modal perception cross-modal illusion perceptual content|
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Citations of this work BETA
John Schwenkler (2014). Vision, Self‐Location, and the Phenomenology of the 'Point of View'. Noûs 48 (1):137-155.
Mohan Matthen (2010). On the Diversity of Auditory Objects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):63-89.
Casey O'Callaghan (2010). Perceiving the Locations of Sounds. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):123--140.
Matthew Fulkerson (2011). The Unity of Haptic Touch. Philosophical Psychology 24 (4):493 - 516.
Louise Richardson (2014). Non Sense-Specific Perception and the Distinction Between the Senses. Res Philosophica 91 (2):215-239.
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