David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press 61-79 (1995)
In what follows, I will contend that the commonsense view of ourselves as fundamental causal agents - for which some have used the term “unmoved movers" but which I think might more accurately be expressed as “not wholly moved movers” - is theoretically understandable, internally consistent, and consistent with what we have thus far come to know about the nature and workings of the natural world. In the section that follows, I try to show how the concept of ‘agent’ causation can be understood as a distinct species (from ‘event’ causation) of the primitive idea, which I’ll term “causal production”, underlying realist or non-Humean conceptions of event causation. In section III, I respond to a number of contemporary objections to the theory of agent causation. Sections IV-V are devoted to showing that the theory is compatible with ordinary reasons explanations of action, which then places me in a position to respond, in the final section, to the contention that we could never know, in principle, whether the agency theory actually describes a significant portion of human activity.
|Keywords||Action Theory Agency Intention Metaphysics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism. Noûs 40 (2):307-330.
Peter A. White (2015). The Pre-Reflective Experience of “I” as a Continuously Existing Being: The Role of Temporal Functional Binding. Consciousness and Cognition 31:98-114.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism. Noûs 40 (2):307–330.
Similar books and articles
Huw Price (1993). Causation as a Secondary Quality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):187 - 203.
Peter Menzies & Huw Price (1993). Causation as a Secondary Quality. BJPS 44 (2):187-203.
Thomas Talbott (2009). God, Freedom, and Human Agency. Faith and Philosophy 26 (4):378-397.
Carl Ginet (1997). Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):85-98.
John D. Bishop (1983). Agent-Causation. Mind 92 (January):61-79.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.
Erasmus Mayr (2011). Understanding Human Agency. Oxford University Press.
Eric Hiddleston (2005). Critical Notice: Timothy O'Connor, Persons and Causes. Noûs 39 (3):541-56.
Markus E. Schlosser (2008). Agent-Causation and Agential Control. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.
Timothy O'Connor (2001). Dualist and Agent-Causal Theories. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will. OUP
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads169 ( #11,973 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #56,985 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?