David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Timothy O'Connor (ed.)
Oxford University Press (1995)
Many philosophers are persuaded by familiar arguments that free will is incompatible with causal determinism. Yet, notoriously, past attempts to articulate how the right type of indeterminism might secure the capacity for autonomous action have generally been regarded as either demonstrably inadequate or irremediably obscure. This volume gathers together the most significant recent discussions concerning the prospects for devising a satisfactory indeterministic account of freedom of action. These essays give greater precision to traditional formulations of the problems associated with indeterministic accounts and to the range of theoretical avenues for pursuing resolutions. The first four essays set out different challenges (from both compatibilists and those skeptical of the possibility of free will) to the adequacy of standard indeterministic theories. The next seven essays meet one or more of these challenges. Each of the fundamental types of approach--simple indeterminism, causal indeterminism, and agent causation--is represented in these novel and sophisticated proposals. The collection finishes with two essays that debate whether compatibilism entails that freedom of choice is a comparatively rare phenomenon within an individual's life. Eloquently presenting some of the most compelling and accessible arguments surrounding this central philosophical issue, Agents, Causes, and Events makes a valuable contribution to courses in free will/action theory and metaphysics.
|Keywords||Free will and determinism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$5.91 used (89% off) $8.75 new (83% off) $47.45 direct from Amazon (6% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1461.A34 1995|
|ISBN(s)||0195091566 0195091574 9780195091571|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ned Markosian (2012). Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383 - 398.
Hagop Sarkissian, Amita Chatterjee, Felipe De Brigard, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols & Smita Sirker (2010). Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal? Mind and Language 25 (3):346-358.
Timothy O'Connor (2009). Degrees of Freedom. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):119 – 125.
Joshua Rasmussen (2010). Cosmological Arguments From Contingency. Philosophy Compass 5 (9):806-819.
Paul Gould (2014). Can God Create Abstract Objects? A Reply to Peter van Inwagen. Sophia 53 (1):99-112.
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