David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Timothy O'Connor (ed.)
Oxford University Press (1995)
Many philosophers are persuaded by familiar arguments that free will is incompatible with causal determinism. Yet, notoriously, past attempts to articulate how the right type of indeterminism might secure the capacity for autonomous action have generally been regarded as either demonstrably inadequate or irremediably obscure. This volume gathers together the most significant recent discussions concerning the prospects for devising a satisfactory indeterministic account of freedom of action. These essays give greater precision to traditional formulations of the problems associated with indeterministic accounts and to the range of theoretical avenues for pursuing resolutions. The first four essays set out different challenges (from both compatibilists and those skeptical of the possibility of free will) to the adequacy of standard indeterministic theories. The next seven essays meet one or more of these challenges. Each of the fundamental types of approach--simple indeterminism, causal indeterminism, and agent causation--is represented in these novel and sophisticated proposals. The collection finishes with two essays that debate whether compatibilism entails that freedom of choice is a comparatively rare phenomenon within an individual's life. Eloquently presenting some of the most compelling and accessible arguments surrounding this central philosophical issue, Agents, Causes, and Events makes a valuable contribution to courses in free will/action theory and metaphysics.
|Keywords||Free will and determinism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$5.97 used (89% off) $21.00 new (58% off) $49.95 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1461.A34 1995|
|ISBN(s)||0195091566 0195091574 9780195091571|
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Hagop Sarkissian, Amita Chatterjee, Felipe De Brigard, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols & Smita Sirker (2010). Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal? Mind and Language 25 (3):346-358.
Matthias Steup (2012). Belief Control and Intentionality. Synthese 188 (2):145-163.
Shaun Nichols (2004). The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts. Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.
Manuel Vargas (2005). The Trouble with Tracing. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269–291.
Oisín Deery (2015). The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):319-334.
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