An evolutionary argument against naturalism?
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):527-540 (1994)
| Abstract | In his recently published two-volume work in epistemology,1 Alvin Plantinga rounds out the discussion (in characteristic fashion) with a subtle and ingenious argument for a striking claim: in this case, his conclusion is that belief in evolutionary naturalism is irrational. Now this claim is not of itself so very surprising; the tantalizing feature here lies rather in the nature of the argument itself. Plantinga contends that taking seriously the hypothesis of evolutionary naturalism [hereafter, N&E] ought to undermine one's confidence in the reliability of our basic cognitive faculties. And if one withholds belief in cognitive reliability, it seems that one ought to likewise refrain from believing propositions that are the output of such faculties. And, for evolutionary naturalists, one such output is belief in evolutionary naturalism itself. Hence, quite apart from comparative evidential considerations that might lead one to prefer theism (or one of its competitors) to N&E, but rather owing to a sort of internal inconsistency (in a suitably broad sense), belief in N&E is shown to be epistemically defective. A bold and intriguing suggestion indeed. Let us take a closer look. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesS. Law (2012). Naturalism, Evolution and True Belief. Analysis 72 (1):41-48.
D. Blake Roeber (2009). Does the Theist Have an Epistemic Advantage Over the Atheist? Journal of Philosophical Research 34:305-328.
J. Wesley Robbins (1994). Is Naturalism Irrational? Faith and Philosophy 11 (2):255-259.
Feng Ye (2011). Naturalized Truth and Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):27-46.
Bernardo Cantens (2006). Cognitive Faculties and Evolutionary Naturalism. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:201-208.
Timothy O'Connor (2001). A House Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand: Plantinga on the Self-Defeat of Evolutionary Naturalism. In James Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Cornell.
Branden Fitelson & Elliott Sober (1998). Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):115–129.
David Reiter (2000). Plantinga on the Epistemic Implications of Naturalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:141-147.
Geoff Childers (2011). What's Wrong with the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):193-204.
N. M. L. Nathan (1997). Naturalism and Self-Defeat: Plantinga's Version. Religious Studies 33 (2):135-142.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads52 ( #20,461 of 556,888 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,122 of 556,888 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
