David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 34 (s14):105-117 (2000)
One familiar affirmative answer to this question holds that these facts suffice to entail that Descartes' picture of the human mind must be mistaken. On Descartes' view, our mind or soul (the only essential part of ourselves) has no spatial location. Yet it directly interacts with but one physical object, the brain of that body with which it is, 'as it were, intermingled,' so as to 'form one unit.' The radical disparity posited between a nonspatial mind, whose intentional and conscious properties are had by no physical object, and a spatial body, all of whose properties are had by no mind, has prompted some to conclude that, pace Descartes, causal interaction between the two is impossible. Jaegwon Kim has recently given a new twist to this old line of thought.(1) In the present essay, I will use Kim's argument as a springboard for motivating my own favored picture of the metaphysics of mind and body and then discussing how an often vilified account of freedom of the will may be realized within it
|Keywords||Causality Free Will Mind|
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Andrew M. Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen & Luke van Horn (2011). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349-360.
Robert Francescotti (2007). Emergence. Erkenntnis 67 (1):47 - 63.
D. Jehle (2006). Kim Against Dualism. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):565-78.
Simon Prosser (2012). Emergent Causation. Philosophical Studies 159 (1):21-39.
Michael Kirchhoff (2014). In Search of Ontological Emergence: Diachronic, But Non-Supervenient. Axiomathes 24 (1):89-116.
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